"... Pimco, the world’s biggest bond fund based in Newport Beach, California, has made Brazilian debt its favorite among emerging markets mostly because of its confidence in the 49- year-old Palocci, who is a congressman from Sao Paulo state and the economic adviser to Rousseff. Brazil’s 11 percent bonds maturing in 2040, the benchmark, tripled to 137 cents on the dollar as the yield declined to 7.81 percent since Pimco increased their holdings eight years ago..."
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terça-feira, 31 de agosto de 2010
sexta-feira, 27 de agosto de 2010
Palestra sobre a crise financeira global
http://vimeo.com/12773619
A Ascensão do Dinheiro
A Ascensão do Dinheiro, Niall Ferguson - Civilização Editora
Em "A Ascensão do Dinheiro", Niall Ferguson demonstra que a actividade financeira é a base do progresso humano.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Tq3m9q3uBg
Em espanhol
El triunfo del dinero/ The Ascent of Money: Como las finanzas mueven el mundo/ A Financial History of the World (Spanish Edition)
Em "A Ascensão do Dinheiro", Niall Ferguson demonstra que a actividade financeira é a base do progresso humano.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Tq3m9q3uBg
Em espanhol
El triunfo del dinero/ The Ascent of Money: Como las finanzas mueven el mundo/ A Financial History of the World (Spanish Edition)
Mueller on youube
Antony Mueller sobre o dólar e a crise do sistema monetário internacional
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_DDU9o-8pTQ
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_DDU9o-8pTQ
quinta-feira, 26 de agosto de 2010
Ciclos financeiros internacionais
Aproveite assistir esta vídeo palestra:
http://newmedia.ufm.edu/gsm/index.php?title=Financial_Cycles%2C_Business_Activity_and_Asset_Valuations
Leia artigo: Financial cycles, business activity and the stock market
http://mises.org/journals/qjae/pdf/qjae4_1_1.pdf
http://newmedia.ufm.edu/gsm/index.php?title=Financial_Cycles%2C_Business_Activity_and_Asset_Valuations
Leia artigo: Financial cycles, business activity and the stock market
http://mises.org/journals/qjae/pdf/qjae4_1_1.pdf
Mueller on youtube
Crítica da política atual dos Estados Unidos de "estimular" crescimento econômico:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9gUGfR4b_ew
Para ler o texto em inglês, veja:
http://mises.org/daily/4158
Para ler o texto em espanhol, veja:
http://mises.org/Community/blogs/euribe/archive/2010/03/15/el-timo-del-est-237-mulo.aspx
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9gUGfR4b_ew
Para ler o texto em inglês, veja:
http://mises.org/daily/4158
Para ler o texto em espanhol, veja:
http://mises.org/Community/blogs/euribe/archive/2010/03/15/el-timo-del-est-237-mulo.aspx
quarta-feira, 25 de agosto de 2010
Dollars and Politics
..."The performance of the US economy in the 20th century owes much to the predominant role of the US dollar in the international monetary system, and a large part of attaining this role was the result of the political and military supremacy that the United States had gained after World War I. The position of the US dollar in the world today represents a major underpinning of the prosperity at home, and provides the basis for the expansion of the US military presence around the globe..."
Leia mais
Leia mais
Recursos para Macroeconomia da Economia Aberta
Podcasts e outros recursos para entender a macroeconomia da economa aberta: http://continentaleconomics.com/AulasOnlineEconomiaAberta.html
Recursos Economia Global
Podcasts e outros recursos para entender a economia global: http://continentaleconomics.com/AulasOnlineEconomiaGlobal.html
terça-feira, 24 de agosto de 2010
segunda-feira, 23 de agosto de 2010
sexta-feira, 20 de agosto de 2010
Os melhores países do mundo seguinte Newsweek
Mapa interativa:
http://www.newsweek.com/content/newsweek/2010/08/15/interactive-infographic-of-the-worlds-best-countries.html
veja também os melhores cidades do mundo:
Mercer's City Ranking Tables
City Country Rating
1 Vienna Austria 108.6
2 Zurich Switzerland 108
3 Geneva Switzerland 107.9
4 Vancouver Canada 107.4
Auckland New Zealand 107.4
6 Düsseldorf Germany 107.2
7 Frankfurt Germany 107
Munich Germany 107
9 Bern Switzerland 106.5
10 Sydney Australia 106.3
Fonte
http://www.newsweek.com/content/newsweek/2010/08/15/interactive-infographic-of-the-worlds-best-countries.html
veja também os melhores cidades do mundo:
Mercer's City Ranking Tables
City Country Rating
1 Vienna Austria 108.6
2 Zurich Switzerland 108
3 Geneva Switzerland 107.9
4 Vancouver Canada 107.4
Auckland New Zealand 107.4
6 Düsseldorf Germany 107.2
7 Frankfurt Germany 107
Munich Germany 107
9 Bern Switzerland 106.5
10 Sydney Australia 106.3
Fonte
Sistema monetário internacional
Economics focus
Paper chains
Tight policies in surplus countries helped undo the gold standard, which is a lesson for the euro
Aug 19th 2010
CHRIS ROCK, a comedian, is a big fan of Oprah Winfrey, a television host and philanthropist. He recalls one of Ms Winfrey’s shows during which a woman confessed to her husband that she had frittered away $300,000 and as a consequence their home was about to be repossessed. “By the end of the show, it was all the guy’s fault,” a clearly impressed Mr Rock told David Letterman, another talk-show host. “He was apologising for not loving her enough—it was the greatest ‘Oprah’ of all time.”
This may seem an odd sort of blame-shifting. Yet reasoning of this kind is increasingly used to explain how spendthrift countries get into trouble. On this view America’s credit boom and bust owed as much to a savings glut in Asia as to laxity at home. A new paper* by Barry Eichengreen of the University of California, Berkeley, and Peter Temin of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, adds a dash of subtlety and a generous slice of history to this sort of analysis. The authors examine the role of fixed exchange rates in booms and busts and draw parallels between the inter-war gold standard and contemporary schemes, such as the euro and China’s peg with the dollar.
The strains in the rich-world economy in the inter-war years sketched out by Messrs Eichengreen and Temin seem eerily familiar to modern students of global imbalances. Today, America is a deficit country but back then it ran large trade surpluses. Unlike Britain, France and Germany, the world’s other big economies, America had kept its currency linked to gold during the first world war. While the others were preoccupied with fighting, America strengthened its export markets at their expense. The European powers emerged from the war with heavy debts and a depleted capital stock. They struggled to contain inflation—or in Germany’s case, hyperinflation.
Backing paper currencies with gold at a fixed rate, as its countries had done before the war, seemed to offer Europe a return to prosperity. By the mid-1920s Britain was back on the gold standard at its pre-war parity, despite inflation and rapid growth in the money supply in the interim. A new German currency was pegged to gold at its pre-war rate. France joined later but at a lower rate; high inflation had made the pre-war rate unrealistic.
This set the stage for a period of wide trade imbalances and for the Depression that followed. America’s export prowess meant that by the end of the 1920s it held almost two-fifths of the world’s gold reserves. A cheaper currency gave French exports a lift and France built up its gold holdings rapidly. The deficit countries in this constellation were Britain and Germany. Britain’s exports struggled against an overvalued currency. The economy was further held back by the high interest rates needed to retain scarce gold reserves. Britain, like Germany, found cutting wages to make exports competitive was made harder by trade unions.
When recession came it was made worse by the strictures of the gold standard. An “unexceptional downturn then was converted into the Great Depression by the actions of central banks and governments,” say the authors. Central banks kept interest rates high to counter fears that their currencies would be devalued and to attract gold deposits. A banking crisis that had spread from Austria and Germany finally forced Britain to abandon its gold peg in September 1931. The following month the Federal Reserve raised interest rates sharply to show America’s commitment to gold. Indeed, America and France shrank their money supplies by more than was strictly necessary by liquidating gold-backed currencies from their reserves. That only increased the deflationary pressures at home and abroad.
The analogy between these events and today’s problems is not perfect, as the authors concede. Modern-day fiat currencies mean that money supply is not restricted by the stock of gold. It can expand elastically to meet the increased demand for cash during a slump. Other differences are less comforting. Countries left the gold standard in wartime without much fuss and discovered they could do the same in peacetime. Those that stayed on gold for longer, such as America, suffered the most painful recessions. Modern members of the euro cannot easily quit it.
What would Keynes (and Oprah) do?
There are similarities, too. The “façade of stability” created by the gold standard encouraged a rapid build-up of loans to deficit countries until doubts were raised about their solvency. The huge foreign debts that Spain, Greece and Portugal ran up during the euro’s first decade are the modern equivalent.
The thing that the authors put most emphasis on is the role of surplus countries in fixed exchange-rate schemes. When trade imbalances reach a limit the onus is on countries with trade deficits to keep the system intact by cutting wages and prices (think of Greece’s struggles today). But countries with surpluses, such as Germany (or China), are not similarly obliged to offset this by boosting their own spending. This defect means fixed exchange-rate schemes have a bias towards deflation.
Messrs Eichengreen and Temin argue that both deficit and surplus countries are equally responsible for making exchange-rate systems work. This was recognised by John Maynard Keynes, who in the 1940s argued for a global clearing bank that would tax or even confiscate the excess earnings of surplus countries. America opposed the principle that creditors should play a role in balance-of-payments adjustments—although it is now in favour of it. This is an irony that Keynes would have appreciated, according to his biographer, Robert Skidelsky. The idea may yet be revived as policymakers in the euro area rewrite the rules governing the currency. Germany, like America in the 1940s, would resist this shift in focus. But perhaps Oprah would approve.
* “Fetters of Gold and Paper” by Barry Eichengreen and Peter Temin. NBER Working Paper number 16202 (July 2010).
Fonte
Paper chains
Tight policies in surplus countries helped undo the gold standard, which is a lesson for the euro
Aug 19th 2010
CHRIS ROCK, a comedian, is a big fan of Oprah Winfrey, a television host and philanthropist. He recalls one of Ms Winfrey’s shows during which a woman confessed to her husband that she had frittered away $300,000 and as a consequence their home was about to be repossessed. “By the end of the show, it was all the guy’s fault,” a clearly impressed Mr Rock told David Letterman, another talk-show host. “He was apologising for not loving her enough—it was the greatest ‘Oprah’ of all time.”
This may seem an odd sort of blame-shifting. Yet reasoning of this kind is increasingly used to explain how spendthrift countries get into trouble. On this view America’s credit boom and bust owed as much to a savings glut in Asia as to laxity at home. A new paper* by Barry Eichengreen of the University of California, Berkeley, and Peter Temin of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, adds a dash of subtlety and a generous slice of history to this sort of analysis. The authors examine the role of fixed exchange rates in booms and busts and draw parallels between the inter-war gold standard and contemporary schemes, such as the euro and China’s peg with the dollar.
The strains in the rich-world economy in the inter-war years sketched out by Messrs Eichengreen and Temin seem eerily familiar to modern students of global imbalances. Today, America is a deficit country but back then it ran large trade surpluses. Unlike Britain, France and Germany, the world’s other big economies, America had kept its currency linked to gold during the first world war. While the others were preoccupied with fighting, America strengthened its export markets at their expense. The European powers emerged from the war with heavy debts and a depleted capital stock. They struggled to contain inflation—or in Germany’s case, hyperinflation.
Backing paper currencies with gold at a fixed rate, as its countries had done before the war, seemed to offer Europe a return to prosperity. By the mid-1920s Britain was back on the gold standard at its pre-war parity, despite inflation and rapid growth in the money supply in the interim. A new German currency was pegged to gold at its pre-war rate. France joined later but at a lower rate; high inflation had made the pre-war rate unrealistic.
This set the stage for a period of wide trade imbalances and for the Depression that followed. America’s export prowess meant that by the end of the 1920s it held almost two-fifths of the world’s gold reserves. A cheaper currency gave French exports a lift and France built up its gold holdings rapidly. The deficit countries in this constellation were Britain and Germany. Britain’s exports struggled against an overvalued currency. The economy was further held back by the high interest rates needed to retain scarce gold reserves. Britain, like Germany, found cutting wages to make exports competitive was made harder by trade unions.
When recession came it was made worse by the strictures of the gold standard. An “unexceptional downturn then was converted into the Great Depression by the actions of central banks and governments,” say the authors. Central banks kept interest rates high to counter fears that their currencies would be devalued and to attract gold deposits. A banking crisis that had spread from Austria and Germany finally forced Britain to abandon its gold peg in September 1931. The following month the Federal Reserve raised interest rates sharply to show America’s commitment to gold. Indeed, America and France shrank their money supplies by more than was strictly necessary by liquidating gold-backed currencies from their reserves. That only increased the deflationary pressures at home and abroad.
The analogy between these events and today’s problems is not perfect, as the authors concede. Modern-day fiat currencies mean that money supply is not restricted by the stock of gold. It can expand elastically to meet the increased demand for cash during a slump. Other differences are less comforting. Countries left the gold standard in wartime without much fuss and discovered they could do the same in peacetime. Those that stayed on gold for longer, such as America, suffered the most painful recessions. Modern members of the euro cannot easily quit it.
What would Keynes (and Oprah) do?
There are similarities, too. The “façade of stability” created by the gold standard encouraged a rapid build-up of loans to deficit countries until doubts were raised about their solvency. The huge foreign debts that Spain, Greece and Portugal ran up during the euro’s first decade are the modern equivalent.
The thing that the authors put most emphasis on is the role of surplus countries in fixed exchange-rate schemes. When trade imbalances reach a limit the onus is on countries with trade deficits to keep the system intact by cutting wages and prices (think of Greece’s struggles today). But countries with surpluses, such as Germany (or China), are not similarly obliged to offset this by boosting their own spending. This defect means fixed exchange-rate schemes have a bias towards deflation.
Messrs Eichengreen and Temin argue that both deficit and surplus countries are equally responsible for making exchange-rate systems work. This was recognised by John Maynard Keynes, who in the 1940s argued for a global clearing bank that would tax or even confiscate the excess earnings of surplus countries. America opposed the principle that creditors should play a role in balance-of-payments adjustments—although it is now in favour of it. This is an irony that Keynes would have appreciated, according to his biographer, Robert Skidelsky. The idea may yet be revived as policymakers in the euro area rewrite the rules governing the currency. Germany, like America in the 1940s, would resist this shift in focus. But perhaps Oprah would approve.
* “Fetters of Gold and Paper” by Barry Eichengreen and Peter Temin. NBER Working Paper number 16202 (July 2010).
Fonte
Uma verdade que "incomoda"
Ludwig von Mises: "The poverty of the backward nations is due to the fact that their policies of expropriation, discriminatory taxation and foreign exchange control prevent the investment of foreign capital while their domestic policies preclude the accumulation of indigenous capital." - The Anti-Capitalistic Mentality
quinta-feira, 19 de agosto de 2010
Crise da dívida dos países "ricos"
Time is running out for the West
The Great Recession has dramatically shrunk the time left for the big AAA states to prevent a full-blown sovereign debt crisis as their demographic time-bomb threatens, US rating agency Moody's has warned.
By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
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The Great Recession has dramatically shrunk the time left for the big AAA states to prevent a full-blown sovereign debt crisis as their demographic time-bomb threatens, US rating agency Moody's has warned.
By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
Leia mais
quarta-feira, 18 de agosto de 2010
Ementa Sistema Monetário e Financeiro Internacional
EMENTA
SISTEMA MONETÁRIO E FINANCEIRO INTERNACIONAL
Prof. Dr. Antony P. Mueller - UFS Departamento de Economia e NURI 2010.2
EMENTA: O sistema monetário internacional – origem, instituições, mecanismos, problemas e abordagens de reforma. O sistema financeiro internacional – finanças internacionais como complemento do comércio internacional, fluxos de capitais, dívida externa, crises cambias. Problema da atualidade. Processos de integração econômica, monetária e financeira. A posição da América Latina e do Brasil no sistema monetário e financeiro internacional de hoje.
PROGRAMA:
1. Apresentação do programa – Critérios da avaliação
2. Introdução
- A economia e finanças internacionais e a política internacional
- A nova disciplina “Economia política internacional”
- Mercados, política e o papel dos estados na arena internacional
- Globalização hoje e no passado
3. A origem do sistema monetário internacional
- Comércio e dinheiro
- Padrão de ouro
- A crise dos anos 20 e a Grande Depressão
- Sistema Bretton Woods I
- A crise do sistema pós-guerra
- Instabilidades do Sistema Bretton Woods II
- Os novos players
- Problemas da atualidade
4. Instituições e mecanismos do sistema monetário internacional
- Instituições do sistema de padrão de ouro
- Instituições do sistema Bretton Woods (IMF, Banco Mundial, OMC, etc.)
- O mecanismo do sistema de Bretton Woods
- Integração monetária regional
- Sistemas monetários em América Latina (plano real, dolarização, currency board, etc.)
- Abordagens de reforma
5. O Sistema financeiro internacional
- Comércio internacional e sistemas de pagamentos
- Fluxos de capital
- Análise de balanço de pagamentos
- Sistemas de taxas de câmbio e seus efeitos
- Dívida externa
- Crises cambiais
6. Integração econômica e financeira
- Motivos e objetivos da integração
- Formas da integração
- Modelos empíricos
- Integração econômica e financeira na América Latina
7. A posição de América Latina e do Brasil no sistema monetário e financeiro internacional
- As décadas perdidas na América Latina
- Origens e conseqüências da crise da dívida latino-americana
- Brasil como membro dos BRIGs
- Brasil como membro do G 20
- A posição do Brasil no contexto de América Latina
- A posição do Brasil no contexto mundial
AVALIAÇÂO:
Três provas, um trabalho opcional, participação na aula, freqüência de presença nas aulas.
METODO:
1. Método: expositivo-dialógico
2. Procedimentos didáticos:
- Apresentações
- Estudos dirigidos em sala de aula
- Trabalhos de pesquisa
- Exercícios analíticos
- Leituras reflexivas
- Analise de exemplos
- Discussão de temas de atualidade
BIBLIOGRAFIA BÁSICA:
Gilpin, Robert: O Desafio do Capitalismo Global. Rio de Janeiro: Record 2004
Gilpin, Robert: A Economia Política das Relações Internacionais. Brasilia: UnB 2002
Mankiw, Gregory N.: Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro: LTC 1998, Cap. 7 e 11 “Macroeconomia da economia aberta”
Bank for International Settlements (BIS): Annual Report. Basel (http://www.bis.org/)
International Monetary Fund: International Financial Statistics: Yearbook. Washington, D.C. (http://www.img.org/)
BIBLIOGRAFIA COMPLEMENTAR:
Friedman, Thomas L.: O Mundo É Plano. Uma Breve História Do Século XXI. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Objetiva 2007 (Para mais referencias bibliográficas veja a lista separada no anexo)
Referências atualizadas e estatísticas mais recentes com recursos adicionais:
Blog: http://www.ecintpol.blogspot.com/
Podcasts: http://continentaleconomics.com/AudioPodcastsemPortugues.html
Data shows e recursos: http://continentaleconomics.com/OnlineCampus.html
Assinar:
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